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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Eugene Estep appeals from the judgment of conviction for rape and
dispensing alcohol to a minor entered following a jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that
the district court erred when it denied him his right to self-representation under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution,
and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857. He further asserts that the district court abused
its discretion when it imposed a fixed life sentence following his conviction for nonforcible rape.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Timothy Eugene Estep was charged, by Amended Information, with rape and
dispensing alcohol to a minor. (R., pp.348-49.) The matter proceeded to a jury trial
following which Mr. Estep was found guilty as to both counts. (Tr., p.343, Ls.3-21.) For
the seventeen months preceding his trial, Mr. Estep made numerous unsuccessful
attempts to discharge defense counsel and represent himself. (See 6/9/11 Tr., p.23,
L.13 - p.28, L.10; R., pp.167, 174; 8/4/11 Tr., p.44, L.21 - p.45, L.21; R., p.176;
11/18/11 Tr., p.55, Ls.17-19; R., p.220; 4/3/12 Tr., p.112, Ls.2-16; R., pp.260-61; Tr., 1
p.11, L.6 - p.12, L.6; R., p.404.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested imposition of a life sentence for
rape, with twenty-five years fixed. (Tr., p.432, Ls.12-17.) Defense counsel requested
no specific underlying sentence, but did ask the district court to retain jurisdiction.

1

All references to "Tr." are to the transcript of the jury trial and sentencing prepared on
February 11, 2013. Citations to other hearings contained in supplemental transcripts
are by date.
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(Tr., p.437,

Ls.10-12.)

Ultimately,

the

district

court,

exceeding

the

recommendation, imposed a fixed life sentence for rape. (Tr., p.463, Ls.2-9.)
Mr. Estep filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.439.)

2

State's

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Estep's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho
Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, when it refused to permit him to represent himself
at trial?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a fixed life sentence
following Mr. Estep's conviction for non-forcible rape?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Estep's Rights Under The Sixth Amendment To The
United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution, And Idaho
Code§§ 19-106 And 19-857 When It Refused To Permit Him To Represent Himself At
Trial

A.

Introduction
Proceedings Before Judge Simpson 2
Mr. Estep first attempted to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to self-

representation at a hearing held on June 9, 2011. Upon being informed of his request,
the district court conducted a lengthy colloquy, covering a number of topics. The district
court first inquired as to Mr. Estep's educational background, to which Mr. Estep
responded,
Well, I have a bachelor's degree and was working on my master's degree.
And I have a little bit of brain damage, but I am overcoming it. I can read
perfectly well. I can write. I can communicate well. I have some issues,
but I think with the right amount of preparation and possibly some help
from - I think I could do this.
(6/9/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.4-14.)
When the district court asked whether he was "prepared at this point," Mr. Estep
replied, "I am prepared as I can be without any witnesses or evidence, which I don't
have anyway, so I think I am okay." (6/9/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-22.) When asked whether
he "want[s] to have witnesses," Mr. Estep answered, "It would be nice to have some
witnesses in my evidence."

(6/9/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.23-25.)

When the district court

inquired as to why he was insistent on going to trial as it was then scheduled despite not

Mr. Estep's attempts to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to selfrepresentation were made before two different district court judges. As such, the facts
surrounding each request will be set forth separately.
4
2

having any witnesses on his behalf, Mr. Estep explained, "If I go with the current
counsel, they have done nothing. So, I don't feel like I would be any worse represented
by myself next Tuesday," noting that he'd already "been in custody for a year," he said,
"I prefer not to wait." (6/9/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-11.)
When he was asked when the "last time you picked a jury" was, he replied, "Well
this will be a new - I will be a novice at that. There is no doubt about it. It is a jury of
my peers." (6/9/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-16.) Joking about the idea of having a jury of his
peers, he noted, "I assume they are all going to be 60-year-old men from Oklahoma."3
(6/9/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.16-17.) Mr. Estep then astutely observed, "All I can do is my best.
If I fail at the - they say only a fool represents himself, and I know this. But I feel at this
point if I fail, at least I went down - I can't blame anyone but me."4 (6/9/11 Tr., p.25,
Ls.21-24.)
The district court then inquired into Mr. Estep's psychological state. Mr. Estep
acknowledged having been hospitalized for approximately six weeks after being found
unable to aid and assist in this case. He explained, "And they evaluated me to be quite
sane, I think. I think that came out exemplary." (6/9/11 Tr., p.25, L.25 - p.26, L.6.) He
also reported having once been sent to a hospital following a suicide attempt, but
"[e]ven then the doctors didn't put me on any medication or anything [because] [t]hey
felt like it was a situational depression." (6/9/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-24.)

Mr. Estep was born in Oklahoma and is in his mid-fifties. (PSI (contained in Sealed
Attachments file), p.467.)
4 This statement is remarkably close to what Justice Potter, writing for the majority in
Faretta, explained when discussing why the "right to defend,": guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, "is given directly to the accused." Justice Potter explained that it is the
accused's right to control his defense because "it is he who suffers the consequences if
the defense fails." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-20. Justice Potter went on to note, "To
thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of
the Amendment." Id. at 820.
3
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When asked about the elements of the rape charge, Mr. Estep explained, "I
would hope they would have some DNA evidence ... and I'm going to assume they
have eyewitnesses, and I'm going to assume they did a rape kit to verify all this."
(6/9/11 Tr., p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.10.) When asked about "typical defenses," Mr. Estep
replied,
Well, typical defenses would have had an investigator, they would have
had eyewitnesses there, they would have talked to people about the
circumstances, they would have had DNA testing done. Oh, they probably
would have cross-examined the witnesses's [sic] friends and checked out
the witnesses' background and basic things. But these weren't done
anyway. So I may not be able to do those, but all I can do is present the
case the best I can, sir. I may not have all of the tools available to me, but
what I do have I will use them the best I can.
(6/11/09 Tr., p.27, L.17 - p.28, L.4.)
The district court's final question was whether Mr. Estep "realize[d] if you
represent yourself and you lose you are potentially looking at a life sentence?"
Mr. Estep responded, "Yes, sir." At that point, the district court announced, "The Court
finds that you are not properly qualified to represent yourself." (6/9/11 Tr., p.28, Ls.510.) The district court did not provide any reasoning or basis for depriving Mr. Estep of
his right to self-representation.
In July 2011, Mr. Estep filed a kite in which he explained, "I need to file a motion
for 'pro-se' under state provisions as set per guidelines with ex-parte and re-movial [sic]
of current countsull [sic]." (R., p.167.) In August 2011, Mr. Estep filed another kite in
which he "plead[ed] [with] the court for removal of current attorney to [go] 'pro-se."'
(R., p.174.)
At a hearing on August 4, 2011, Judge Simpson noted that he'd received "a third
request to represent yourself" from Mr. Estep. In addressing the renewed requests for
self-representation, the district court merely stated, "The first time you asked me to
6

represent yourself I told you no, I don't find you to be competent to do so, after we
discussed the issue. You need the assistance of counsel." (8/4/11 Tr., p.44, Ls.19-24.)
Several days later, Mr. Estep again filed a kite in which he requested that he be allowed
to represent himself. (R., p.176.)
At a hearing on November 18, 2011, conflict counsel advised the district court
that he had received the competency evaluation for Mr. Estep, which concluded "that he
is competent to proceed as a defendant ... But it finds he is not competent to proceed
on his own." 5 (11/18/11 Tr., p.55, Ls.10-16.) In response, the district court announced,
"Well, I already found that he is not competent to proceed as his own attorney in the
case. I have no intention of letting him represent himself." (11/18/11 Tr., p.55, Ls.17-19
(emphasis added).)
In a letter dated February 6, 2012, filed with the district court on February 9,
2012, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare evaluator wrote, "The assessment
that I completed on Timothy Estep concluded that he does not have a mental illness.
His behaviors are due to a severe Personality Disorder and are under his volitional

The portion of the report in which the psychologist addresses the issue of selfrepresentation, written based on interviews and tests conducted in July 2011, reads as
follows:
5

It is the opinion of this examiner that Mr. Estep does not have the capacity
to adequately represent himself as his own attorney. During the current
examination he gave inconsistent answers, had difficulty giving clear and
consistent responses to similar types of questions, and while he likely has
better ability than he currently presents with, that ability is actually at an
unknown level. Therefore in his own best interest, he would appear to
need the benefit of external council [sic].
This evaluation, it should be noted was quite complicated and somewhat
tentative in nature ....
(Psychological Evaluation, dated July 15 & 28, 2011 (contained in Sealed Attachments
file) (hereinafter Psychological Evaluation (July 2011)), p.341.)

7

control." (Letter from Linda C. Hill, MS, LCPC (contained in Sealed Attachments file),
p.342.) A redacted copy of the psychological report referenced by defense counsel at
the September 2011 hearing was filed with the district court on February 3, 2012.
(Psychological Evaluation (July 2011 ), p.330.)
In a psychological evaluation to determine Mr. Estep's fitness to proceed to trial,
conducted in November 2010 and filed with the district court on November 26, 2010, the
psychologist concluded that, although Mr. Estep "may have mild cognitive impairments,
they do not significantly affect his fitness to proceed.

It is highly likely that he is

malingering his memory deficits as a way to avoid the legal process." (Psychological
Report, dated November 16, 2010 (contained in Sealed Attachments file) (hereinafter,
Psychological Report (November 2010)), pp.20, 24.) That evaluation also included a
discussion of results from the Test of Memory Malingering, which results were "far
below what would be expected of individuals with genuine neurological impairment."
(Psychological Report (November 2010), p.23.)

The November 2010 report's

conclusion is consistent with the July 2011 psychological evaluation in which the
psychologist noted,

It is suspected that he does have a cognitive impairment to some extent,
although the actual extent is unknown. Taken at face value, the scores
obtained during this evaluation are quite low and not consistent with the
level of independence, planning, organization, and facility in being [in] the
community reported by others such as his guardian. The scores and
presentation would be more consistent with an individual needing
residential care rather than managing the independence he appears to
have been capable of. Additionally, while his memory was such that he
could not recall personal information, he was able to provide sufficient
contact information for the examiner to locate an attorney he had worked
with 10 years earlier, and with his guardian who lives in Washington State.
Mr. Estep at the conclusion of the second session indicated that his public
defender (Ann Taylor) "has a big surprise coming" and when asked to
elaborate indicated that he had initiated a suit against her that he did not
wish to discuss. Although the examiner was unaware of this at that time,
his statement did in fact prove to be true, necessitating a change in
8

attorneys and delay in completing this evaluation.
It is therefore
suspected that Mr. Estep is capable of better memory and planning than
his presentation and test scores would suggest.
(Psychological Evaluation (July 2011), p.339 (emphases added).)
On February 27, 2012, the district court issued an Order in which it found "that
the defendant, after evaluation ordered by This Court pursuant to Idaho Code 18-211, is
found to be competent and fit to proceed to trial and to assist in his own defense."
(R., p.209.)

It contained no mention of Mr. Estep's competence to act as his own

attorney. (R., p.209.) On March 29, 2012, Mr. Estep filed a kite with the district court
again expressing his desire to represent himself. (R., p.220.)
At a hearing on April 3, 2012, the district court considered and denied Mr. Estep's
renewed request to represent himself, explaining,
Mr. Estep, with respect to your motion to represent yourself, we have
already done that twice. I have already told you no twice. I am telling you
no again. You have an attorney. You are going to continue to have an
attorney unless you get to a much better condition where I think you can
communicate and represent yourself.
So your motion for pro se
representation is denied.

Mr. Estep, from here on out if you send me a kite from the jail, I'm not
going to look at it. Communicate through your attorney. It's an ex parte
contact; that is inappropriate. You have counsel. Communicate through
counsel.
(4/3/12 Tr., p.112, Ls.2-16.)

Proceedings Before Judge Mitchell
Approximately one month before trial, Judge Simpson voluntarily disqualified
himself. (R., p.258) After Judge Simpson disqualified himself and Judge Mitchell was
assigned, defense counsel filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw or to Allow Defendant
to Proceed Pro Se with Stand-By Counsel. In the Motion, defense counsel explained
g

that the request was based, in part, on the fact that "Defendant has clearly demanded
his right to represent himself." (R., pp.260-61.) Following a hearing, at which Mr. Estep
was not asked any questions prior to the district court's ruling but at which defense
counsel represented, "Well, Your Honor, Mr. Estep has exercised his right to proceed
pro se.

He's informed me this morning that he does not want to proceed pro se;

instead, he just wants a different attorney," the district court denied the Motion in all
respects. (Tr., p.11, L.6- p.12, L.6.)
Regardless of whether Mr. Estep's attorney could have waived the issue of selfrepresentation at the hearing on defense counsel's motion, three days before trial
started, Mr. Estep filed a kite with the district court in which he again sought to exercise
his right to self-representation, specifically seeking "to bring a motion to pro-se if not
total then for cross examination of any prosecution withiness [sic]."

(R., p.404

(underlining in original).)6 The district court made no attempt to address this request
with Mr. Estep (See generally R. and Tr.), although it forwarded copies to defense
counsel and the prosecuting attorney the day before trial. (R., p.404.)
Mr. Estep asserts that his right to self-representation, under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution,
and Idaho Code§§ 19-106 and 19-857, was violated when the district court first denied

Mr. Estep also continued to file kites in which he expressed a desire to proceed prose
(R., pp.294 (requesting that the court "file a motion ex-part [sic] pro-se to have
defendant's witness list amended"), 295 (asking "the court to file pro-sae [sic] ex-part
[sic]" to test DNA evidence through an independent lab), and other kites in which he
sought rulings and relief while acknowledging that he was still represented by counsel.
(R., pp.283 ("plead[ing] [with] the courts [sic] to file a motion to review the Order of Exparte by [defense counsel]," explaining that what he sought was "vidule [sic] to my
defince [sic") and 288 ("plea[ding] [with] the court to file a motion to provide defendant
witness list for trial," and that "without this motion a grave judical [sic] oversight my [sic]
happen").)
6

10

and then ignored his requests to proceed pro se.

Because the error was objected-to

and structural, the violation of his right to self-representation requires that his
convictions be set aside, with this matter remanded for a new trial at which his right to
self-representation is honored.

8.

The District Court Violated Mr. Estep's Rights Under The Sixth Amendment To
The United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution, And
Idaho Code §§ 19-106 And 19-857 When It Refused To Permit Him To
Represent Himself At Trial

1.

Sixth Amendment Violation

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part,
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.

The Sixth

Amendment includes a right to self-representation when a person has knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by counsel. Faretta

v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Such a waiver is considered knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary if the person is "made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation."

Id. at 835. Denial of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation

is "structural error," requiring "automatic reversal." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,
8 (1999) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)).
In Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the United States Supreme Court
explained that limitations can be placed on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation when that person is too mentally incompetent to act as his own counsel
but still mentally competent enough to aid and assist in his own defense. Edwards, 554
U.S. at 174-79.
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Edwards provides no guidance, let alone a standard, as to when it is appropriate

or constitutional to deprive a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent,
Today's holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does not accept
Indiana's position that self-representation can be denied '"where the
defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury,"' ante,
at 2388. It does not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right
to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental competence can
under some circumstances form a basis for denying the right to proceed
pro se, ante, at 2381-2382. We will presumably give some meaning to
this holding in the future, but the indeterminacy makes a bad holding
worse.
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 189. Justice Scalia went on to warn of the slippery slope created

by the Supreme Court's vague and standard-free opinion, explaining, "Once the right of
self-representation of the mentally ill is a sometime thing, trial judges will have every
incentive to make their lives easier - to avoid the painful necessity of deciphering
occasional pleadings of the sort contained in the Appendix to today's opinion - by
appointing knowledgeable and literate counsel." Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals, applying Edwards, has explained that competency
requires not just a capacity to understand proceedings, but to have a rational
understanding, and whether it is appropriate, under the Sixth Amendment, to grant a
defendant's request for self-representation involves a determination of whether the
defendant is "rational enough to represent himself rather than be represented by
counsel." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 779 (Ct. App. 2009). In United States v.
Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060 (9th cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit explained that some

"indications" that the Edwards exception to the right to self-representation "does not
apply" include consideration of whether the defendant "was either malingering or

12

intentionally obstructing the proceedings to inject error" and the absence of "a 'severe
mental illness."' Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1068.
In Mr. Estep's case, Judge Simpson made no substantive factual findings
regarding his inability to represent himself. He merely concluded, without reference to
anything specific, that Mr. Estep was either not qualified or not competent to represent
himself. (6/9/11 Tr., p.28, Ls.9-10 ("The Court finds that you are not properly qualified
to represent yourself."); 8/4/11 Tr., p.44, Ls.21-23 ("The first time you asked to
represent yourself I told you no, I don't find you competent to do so, after we discussed
the issue. You need the assistance of counsel."); 11/18/11 Tr., p.55, Ls.17-19 ("Well, I
already found that he is not competent to proceed as his own attorney in the case. I
have no intention of letting him represent himself."); 4/3/12 Tr., p.112, Ls.2-9
("Mr. Estep, with respect to your motion to represent yourself, we have already done
that twice [sic]. I have already told you no twice [sic]. I am telling you no again. You
have an attorney. You are going to continue to have an attorney unless you get to a
much better condition where I think you can communicate and represent yourself. So
your motion for pro se representation is denied.").) Judge Simpson also provided no
explanation or standard as to how Mr. Estep could demonstrate competence for selfrepresentation to his satisfaction.
Nothing contained in the record indicates that Mr. Estep is incapable of
coherently and rationally communicating in legal proceedings. In fact, the record shows
exactly the opposite. At the hearing on Mr. Estep's first motion to represent himself, the
Judge Simpson asked Mr. Estep a series of questions, to which he provided rational,
clear answers, including even inserting a fairly sophisticated humorous observation

13

regarding a jury of his peers and an observation concerning self-representation that
mirrored one made by Justice Potter in Faretta. (6/9/11 Tr., p.24, L.4 - p.28, L.8.)
Despite this first denial, Mr. Estep continued to pursue his right to selfrepresentation, filing a renewed request to exercise his right. (R., p.167.) One week
later, meticulously following the instructions on the kite form that each form contain "only
one request," Mr. Estep filed two separate kites concerning trial preparation issues. In
the first, he requested that the district court issue an order allowing him to have non-jail
clothing for trial, which he noted was two weeks away, and in the second, he requested
a court order that he be provided a haircut and that his beard be trimmed so he could
shave it before trial. 7 (R., pp.172-73 (capitalization changed).) These actions are not
those of a person incapable of effective communication and not rational enough to
represent himself.
Judge Mitchell's failure to address Mr. Estep's final request to proceed pro se
was erroneous, as "a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is
empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay." Fritz v. Spalding, 682
F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).

As the Ninth Circuit explained, a

criminal defendant "must (however) have a last clear chance to assert his constitutional
right ... before meaningful trial proceedings have commenced." Id. (quoting United
States v. Chapman, 553 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977)) (parentheses and ellipsis in

original). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that due process requires that
a person have the opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of one of his rights.

Mr. Estep astutely explained the reason he requested a beard trim before he could
shave it, noting that his beard was "to [sic] Long To cut with Jail Razors." (R., p.173.)
This is hardly the work of a person who cannot communicate coherently or make
rational decisions.
7
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See Mays v. District Court, 34 Idaho 200, _, 20 P. 115, 116 (1921) ("Due process of
law requires that one be heard before his rights are adjudged.") (citation omitted);
Gilbert v. Elder, 65 Idaho 383, _, 144 P.2d 194, 196 (1943) ("[DJue process of law has
been variously held to mean a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.") (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115 (1983) ("The right to procedural due
process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions requires that
a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
No finding was made that Mr. Estep's last clear attempt to exercise his right to
represent himself was made for the purpose of delay, as the district court made no
decision on the request, instead merely forwarding it to defense counsel and the
prosecuting attorney. All indications in the record are that Mr. Estep did not intend to
use his request to represent himself as a delay tactic; most notable is the fact that, at
the hearing on his first motion to represent himself, Mr. Estep made it clear that he did
not want his request to alter the then-existing trial date. (6/4/11 Tr., p.28, L.9 - p.29,
L.5.) Mr. Estep was not given the meaningful opportunity to be heard required under
both the United States and Idaho Constitutions before his Sixth Amendment right to
self-representation was impliedly denied for the final time.
Regarding Judge Simpson's decisions concerning Mr. Estep's competency, even
assuming they were somehow based on implied findings of fact, Mr. Estep maintains
that the facts do not support such a conclusion, and show instead, that under the Sixth
Amendment, Mr. Estep was competent to represent himself.

In addition to the

observations and conclusions of the various psychological professionals discussed in
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the Introduction and argument, supra, a number of other facts contained in the record
support a finding of competence to proceed pro se under the Sixth Amendment.
First, on the morning of the first day of trial, Judge Mitchell allowed Mr. Estep to
make a purportedly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present
at trial (and appeal any claim of error in allowing him to do so). After asking Mr. Estep
"a couple questions regarding competency," and receiving apparently satisfactory
answers, the district court declared, "All right.

You've convinced me that you're

competent to make that decision .... " (Tr., p.38, L.10 - p.40, L.5.) The decision as to
whether to waive one's appearance before a jury on a serious felony, carrying a
potential life sentence, involves the kind of decision more akin to self-representation
than it does to a guilty plea. It requires a rational weighing of the impact such a decision
will have on the outcome of the trial, most notably how it will be perceived by the jury. If
he was competent to make that type of strategic decision, then it is difficult to say he
couldn't have made similar decisions while acting as his own attorney.
Second, following the jury's verdict, denying defense counsel's request that
sentencing occur at some time more distant than when it was scheduled (eight days
after the verdict), the district court explained,
Well, that's when I'm going to have sentencing. This event, which is no
longer alleged, occurred two years and three months ago. If there is
evidence in mitigation, I would've expected that to be available to
Mr. Estep at all times during that last two years and three months.
Mr. Estep seems quite competent and able to aid and assist his counsel
and can certainly give any mitigating evidence that exists on this planet to
[defense counsel] essentially instantly.
(Tr., p.349, L.19 - p.350, L.2 (emphasis added).)
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Next, just prior to sentencing, when denying a motion to continue sentencing to
allow Mr. Estep to secure witnesses to rebut information contained in the PSI, the
district court explained,
Additionally, the Court has, even though the Court hasn't been the
assigned judge for very long, has seen the manipulation that Mr. Estep
has visited upon the judicial system, and he's perpetuating that at least at
the time of the trial, he was refusing to eat again, and I'm not willing to
allow your client to put himself into a condition where he's not competent
to be sentenced.
(Tr., p.387, Ls.11-17 (emphasis added).)
Further undercutting any argument that Mr. Estep was somehow incapable of
acting as his own attorney is the district court's post-trial description of Mr. Estep's legal
abilities, namely, "You've played the justice system better than anybody I've ever seen.
You're a master, and it's because of that there is no way - even if you're not a serial
rapist you're a sociopath that can't be treated in our community. (Tr., p.462, Ls.7-13
(emphasis added).)
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Estep asserts that the district court violated
his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when it denied his repeated attempts
to exercise the right and when it ignored his final, timely attempt to exercise the right.
Because the error is structural, the only remedy available for such a violation is remand
for a new trial.

2.

Article I, § 13 And Idaho Code§§ 19-106 And 19-857 Violations

Article I,§ 13, of the Idaho Constitution, in relevant part provides, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right ... to appear and defend in person
and with counsel." lo. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 13. In State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860
(1989), the Idaho Supreme Court, interpreting both the Sixth Amendment and Article
17

I,§ 13, held, "Ultimately, the decision of whether to exercise the right to counsel or
proceed pro se is for the defendant's to make. The role of the trial court is simply to
ensure that where the defendant waives the right to counsel he or she does so
knowingly and intelligently."

Lankford, 116 Idaho at 865.

The opinion did not

differentiate between the similar provisions in both the federal and Idaho constitutions.
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has, since Lankford, diminished
the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, does not mean that the Idaho
Supreme Court should do likewise with respect to the similar right provided for in Article

I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained,
We do not suggest, however, that if federal courts were to change these
rules we would likewise change ours, unless, of course, our rules were
now held to violate the federal constitution. The reason is that federal and
state constitutions derive their power from independent sources. It is thus
readily apparent that state courts are at liberty to find within the provisions
of their own constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the
federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
This is true even when the constitutional provisions implicated contain
similar phraseology. Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly
apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when
in the process of interpreting their own constitutions.

State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6 (1985) (citation to Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
719 (1975) omitted).
In addition to the Idaho Constitution's guarantee of the right to selfrepresentation, two Idaho statutes confer such a right, in a manner that suggests a
more robust right than is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Idaho Code § 19857 provides:
A person who has been appropriately informed of his right to counsel may
waive any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of
or after waiver, finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his
rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise
according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's
18

age, education and familiarity with the English language and the
complexity of the crime involved.
I.C. § 19-857 (emphasis added). Additionally, Idaho Code§ 19-106, in relevant part,
provides, "In a criminal action the defendant is entitled ... [t]o be allowed counsel as in
civil actions, or to appear and defend in person and with counsel." I.C.§ 19-106. The
Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Athens, 36 Idaho 224 (1922), has interpreted this
statute8 as providing a defendant with "the right to appear for himself' without counsel.

State v. Athens, 36 Idaho at_, 210 P. 133, 134 (1922) ("The same statute that gave
him the right to counsel gave him the right to appear for himself.").
Assuming that this Court finds no Sixth Amendment violation of Mr. Estep's right
to self-representation, he asserts that, relying on Article I, § 13, Idaho Code§§ 19-106
and 19-857, and the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho Code § 19-106 in

Athens, his right to self-representation under Idaho law was violated when the district
court repeatedly denied his requests to represent himself at trial.

Because the error

was both objected-to and structural, his convictions must be vacated with this matter
remanded for a new trial at which he is afforded his Idaho constitutional and statutory
right to self-representation.

See State v. Per,y, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28 (2010)

(announcing Idaho appellate rule in which, inter alia, "[w]here the [objected-to] error in
question is a constitutional violation found to constitute a structural defect, affecting the
base structure of the trial to the point that a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its
function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, the appellate court shall
automatically vacate and remand").

8

Athens predates the statute's renumbering to I.C. § 19-106.
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11.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Fixed Life Sentence
Following Mr. Estep's Conviction For Non-Forcible Rape
A.

Introduction
Assuming that this Court does not grant the relief requested in Part I, supra,

Mr. Estep asserts that, in light of his brain injury and the nature of his offense, the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a fixed life sentence following his
conviction for non-forcible rape. 9

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Fixed Life Sentence
Following Mr. Estep's Conviction For Non-Forcible Rape
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively

harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting
State

v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Mr. Estep does not allege that his

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Estep must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and

Any claim concerning the sentence imposed for dispensing alcohol to a minor is moot,
as that sentence has been served.
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9

the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
Perhaps the most important factor demonstrating the unreasonableness of the
fixed life sentence imposed on Mr. Estep for non-forcible rape is the nature of the
offense. Unlike fixed life rape sentences that have been upheld as reasonable, the rape
in this case was non-forcible.

See State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 (1992)

(upholding fixed life sentence for rape because "[t]he gravity of the offense in this case
was very great. Brown not only rape the victim but almost killed her. Only remarkable
medical procedures saved her life. While this is not a homicide case, it might well have
been.").
Mr. Estep used no force or threat of force to commit the rape. He instead took
advantage of the victim's voluntarily intoxicated state to engage in non-consensual
sexual intercourse with her. When she became aware of what was happening, he did
not use force to attempt to continue the assault, nor did he threaten her in any way; in
fact, he immediately got out of the bed when she awoke. (Tr., p.122, L.6 - p.135, L.1.)
Although after she left his home, he caught up to her in his car and attempted to
persuade her to let him give her a ride home, he did not make any threats or use any
force in attempting to get her to accept his offer. (Tr., p.135, L.2 - p.137, L.4.)
Additionally, unlike when the Idaho Supreme Court has upheld a fixed life
sentence for similar conduct, namely lewd conduct, the offense in this case was not
committed over a prolonged period of time and Mr. Estep is not someone with a history
of violence. See State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671-72 (1999) (district court's fixed life
sentence for lewd conduct was appropriate in light of prolonged nature of the offenses
and the defendant's "potential for violence," including throwing a chair in his incident
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upon being confronted by a victim and his assertion that he '"gets even" with those who
wrong him). In Cross, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that it has long noted that,
while "lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor less than sixteen is a serious crime, a
fixed-life sentence is a serious penalty and should not be imposed lightly." Id. at 672
(citations omitted).
Reiterating its precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, '"a fixed life
sentence should not be regarded as a judicial hedge against uncertainty,"' explaining
that "such a sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could
never be safely released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that
the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the
Idaho Supreme Court explained that it, and the Idaho Court of Appeals, "have upheld
fixed life sentences [for lewd conduct] where the 'defendant's conduct was violent,
repetitive, very cruel, or life threatening."' Id. (citation omitted).
Mr. Estep's conduct was not "violent, repetitive, very cruel, or life threatening."
His offense did not involve the use of force or threats of force, nor does the record
indicate any reputation or history of violence.

Further, the district court's fixed life

sentence was most definitely a hedge against uncertainty, as the district court explained
that it was rejecting the State's request for less than a fixed life sentence, reasoning,
The final criteria [sic] is retribution or punishment. The punishment has to
fit the crime. The punishment has to be proportionate to the crime
committed. A fixed life sentence is the maximum that can be given, and I
appreciate that. I feel that I am acting within the bounds of my discretion
in imposing the maximum. I don't want S.L.G., your 2006 victim, to have
any doubt that you will ever be out again in society. I certainly do not want
C.C. to ever have any doubt in her mind that you will ever be out in
society.
With everything you've shown me, even if I were to have followed [the
prosecutor's] suggestion of 25 years [fixed], you'd still be nearly 80,
probably unable physically to do a lot, but I've seen paraplegics commit
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additional crimes. I've seen people that can barely shuffle commit and
lure people in, commit crimes and lure people in, so there's just - there's
no way I am willing to entertain anything other than a fixed life sentence.
(Tr., p.462, L.17 - p.463, L.9.)
Mr. Estep appears to have led a largely crime-free life prior to his brain injury in
2000, 10 after which time he was convicted of felony injury to a child (reduced from lewd
conduct) and use of a telephone to harass (reduced from stalking in the second
degree). (PSI, pp.469-71.)
In light of the nature of the offense and Mr. Estep's brain injury, he asserts that
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a fixed life sentence following his
conviction for non-forcible rape.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Estep respectfully requests that, due to the
violation of his statutory and constitutional right to self-representation, this Court vacate
his convictions and remand this matter for a new trial. In the alternative, if this Court
concludes that his right was not violated, he respectfully requests that it reduce his
sentence to a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2013.

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

Mr. Estep suffered some degree of brain damage as a result of hypoxia following a
seizure. (Sealed Attachments file, pp.417-19.)
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